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Review Article: The Politics of 'Islam'-
A Second Look
FREDHALLIDAY*
The term 'fundamentalism' has been in use since the 1920s, originating as a
description of Protestant sects opposed to 'modernism' within Christianity, and
in particular to Darwinian theories of evolution. Yet it is the more recent rise
of fundamentalist movements, over the past two decades, specifically in a range
of Islamic countries, but accompanied by the emergence of comparable
movements elsewhere (Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist), that has generated
a wide-ranging response, in both academic and policy circles.' Some of this
response has been exaggerated, both as to the novelty of these movements and
as to their probable or actual political import: there have been movements of
a 'return' to religious texts before, in all the major Western religions, as there
have been movements that have served to combine religious with political goals.
In the literature on Muslim societies, it has become conventional to distinguish
'Islamic' from 'Islamist' movements, the former denoting any religiously
oriented trend, the latter the specific Islamic variant of fundamentalism.2 These
latter, and cognate trends elsewhere, constitute a major and in some respects new
factor in the domestic and international politics of much of the world. They are,
moreover, movements that show no sign of going away: in the Islamic world,
fundamentalists are in power in Iran and the Sudan; they threaten to come to
power in Algeria and Egypt, and perhaps elsewhere; and they have in the Refah
(welfare) Party made significant gains in secularist Turkey; in Israel and the
United States there are resilient fundamentalist currents; in India, the mass
mobilizations of the Hindu fundamentalists have altered the political landscape
and promise too to make a serious bid for power.
As with nationalist movements, fundamentalists are keen to proclaim their
originality vis-a-vis other contemporary political currents and their derivation
from timeless, perennial sources of legitimation; and, as with nationalism,
it is pertinent to point out the similarities between them and the
* Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science.
1
 For comparative analyses see Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, eds, Fundamentalisms and the
State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
2
 As will become evident (fn. 5 below) there are some problems with applying the term
•fundamentalist' to Muslim movements. Nikki Keddie has argued that the term 'Islamist' is probably
the most accurate, distinguishing belief ('Islamic') from 'movements to increase Islam's role in
society and politics, usually with the goal of an Islamic state'; see 'The Islamist Movement in
Tunisia", Maghreb Review, 11 (1986), 26-39, p. 26.
400 HALLIDAY
recent, often contingent and arbitrary, factors that have led to their growth. It
is, in this sense, not difficult to identify what these movements have in common
and how indeed, not just within the same religion but across religious barriers,
they learn from, and imitate, each other. What defines contemporary
fundamentalism is not on its own the call for a return to the literal reading of
a holy text, but the combination of this appeal with an intervention in the political
system, a mobilization of populations and the building of an organization for
the taking, and retention, of political power.3 This political project, along with
intolerance, is something that these movements do have in common. Yet while
there are important reasons, of analysis and of political attitude, to stress the
features these movements have in common, there are also important differences:
Christianity and Islam have a long record of state power and imperial expansion,
whereas Judaism does not; Judaism, Islam and Hinduism are much more
concerned with the regulation of social behaviour, and diet, than is Christianity;
Islamic and Hindu fundamentalists thrive in societies with an intense experience
of foreign domination. Whatever their differences, however, the fundamentalist
trend poses challenges to states and to international politics: Iran, and now
Algeria, are major international preoccupations.
These trends also challenge social science: first, in demanding an explanation
as to the causes and character of its spread; secondly, in requiring a response
to what appear to be unpredicted developments, that challenge conventional
expectations on modernity, progress, increasing secularization, and political
convergence. As much as with the rise of nationalism, it may be that the
expectations of the past decades on how societies, developed or developing, are
changing will prove to be wrong - the world is neither as globalized or as
disenchanted as was expected; but it may also be that, beneath the appearance
of rupture and of a 'return' to something past, other, more contemporary and
recognizable, processes are at work. If the rise of Islamic as of other
fundamentalism can be seen as a challenge to our conception of modernity, it
can also be argued that this same 'iron cage', the constraints of contemporary
industrial and political life, has shaped and will, in the end, determine this
phenomenon.
RESPONSES TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION
The literature generated on the Islamic fundamentalist movement, and the issues
around which debate proceeded, were to a considerable extent stimulated by the
success of the Iranian revolution of 1979. The analyses produced in this initial
phase could, broadly, be divided into two currents, what one may term the
'essentialists' and the 'contingencists': in several respects, this parallels the
debate on nationalism between Antony Smith, with his emphasis on an enduring
3
 For analyses that stress the similarities see Giles Kepel, The Revenge of God: The Resurgence
of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), and Hava
Lazarus-Yafeh, 'Contemporary Fundamentalism - Judaism, Christianity, Islam', Jerusalem Quar-
terly, no. 47 (Summer 1988), 27-39.
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ethnic 'sub-stratum' and Ernest Gellner, who stresses the 'modernity' of
nationalism. The former included both proponents of true 'Islam' itself, and
those in the West who, with greater or lesser justice, have been termed
'orientalists', that is, those who argued that the Islamic world was dominated
by a set of relatively enduring and unchanging processes and meanings, to be
understood through the texts of Islam itself and the language it generated.4 For
both these groups, the Islamists and the orientalists, the rise of the Islamist
movement raised very few methodological or analytical questions, since it
merely revealed the 'true' character of these countries. Indeed, it is remarkable
that in the mass of literature produced since the late 1970s on the Islamic upsurge
very few are from these schools - precisely because, within this framework,
there is very little new to explain.
Against this approach, there emerged a substantial body of literature that
denied any essence to 'Islam', whether defined by believers or social scientists,
and instead looked at these Islamist movements as products of late twentieth-
century society. If this latter literature were to be summarized, then at least three
strands would be contained in it.5 First, much of this writing on Islamist
movements stressed not their invocation of 'tradition', or of a return to the past,
but their contemporaneity and modernity: they were responses to problems
experienced in these societies in the contemporary world - corrupt states, mass
unemployment, chaotic urbanization, a sense of external domination, spurious
democratic systems. The very programmes the fundamentalists offered and the
ideas they propounded were, for all their Koranic and religious form, similar to
those of other Third World radical and populist movements, emphasizing such
themes as oppression and liberation, corruption and authenticity, elite and
mass.6 There are significant differences between classical populism and
4
 A good example of this approach is Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (London:
University of Chicago Press, 1988). The debate between 'orientalists' and their critics has generated
much hot air and has in the main avoided the question of how social scientists actually analyse these
societies. By far the best critique of the 'orientalists' is Maxime Rodinson, Europe and the Mystique
of Islam (London: University of Washington Press, 1991). For my own attempt to disentangle this
debate see ' "Orientalism" and its critics', British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 20 (1993),
145-63.
5
 I would give as examples of this Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State (London:
Routledge, 1989); Nikki Keddie, Iran: Roots of Revolution (London: Yale University Press, 1981);
Michael Gilsenan, Recognizing Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990); Edward Mortimer, Faith and
Power (London: Faber, 1982); Bassam Tibi, The Crisis of Modern Islam (Salt Lake City: University
of Utah Press, 1988); Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi, eds, State and Ideology in the Middle East
and Pakistan (London: Macmillan, 1988); Aziz al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London: Verso,
1993). In another perceptive and wide-ranging survey, Nazih Ayubi, in Political Islam: Religion and
Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991) has, while writing within the "contingentist'
framework, sought to examine the specific cogency of cultural and doctrinal elements in Islamism.
6
 For discussion of the ideology of the Iranian revolution see Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1993); and Paul Vieille and Farhad Khosrokhavar, Le Discours populaire de
la revolution iranienne, two vols (Paris: Contemporaneite, 1990). My one disagreement with
Abrahamian is that, while he argues that the terms 'fundamentalist' and "populist" are incompatible,
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fundamentalism, not least the former's secular, often anti-clerical, character, its
invocation of the working class, and the role played within it by the armed
forces: but there is also substantial thematic and social overlap. The widespread
rejection of democracy and of ideas of cosmopolitanism and internationalism,
albeit phrased in Islamic terms, are a reflection of this common condition. The
Iranian revolution and its aftermath have been accompanied by the emergence
of a new vocabulary of politics, either redefining and reviving old words, or
creating new ones.7 In his analysis of Arabic and other Islamist discourses, Aziz
al-Azmeh shows how its category of the state is derived from the Jacobin
model.8 Secondly, for all the appearance of a single, pan-Islamic current, and
the reality of co-operation and inspiration linking these movements, the
Islamists varied considerably between countries, depending on the religious,
political and social character of each: thus, in some (for example, Iran) the
leadership was clerical, whilst in others it was lay (North Africa); in Iran the
movement was almost wholly urban, in neighbouring Afghanistan it was rural
(albeit under leadership of urban intellectuals or notables). Thirdly, the literature
stressed that the rise of the Islamist movements was not just a return to some
'true' or 'authentic' tradition, but a response, at the level of peoples as much
as intellectuals, to the perceived failures of the post-independence regimes,
whose corruption and inefficiency, and pure arrogance, had alienated the
populations over whom they ruled: this was true in the Algeria of the FLN and
the Libya of Qaddafi as in post-Nasserist Egypt and the Shah's Iran.9
The rise of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the Palestinian
territories has been based on hostility to the perceived inefficiency and
corruption of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which, although
not in power, had behaved with many of the characteristics of a nationalist
regime; that of Refah in Turkey is against the Kemalist state. What defines these
movements as 'political' is, therefore, not just the context in which they arise
and the language they use, but their goals and the means they used to achieve
that goal: the goal is political power, control of the state and the maintenance
of that control. The means have been an eminently secular set of options, from
general strikes and mass demonstrations (as in Iran), to guerrilla war
(Afghanistan), assassination (Egypt, Algeria), infiltration of the armed forces
(F'note continued)
I would prefer to suggest that the Iranian case was precisely one in which these two elements
overlapped, and that there are certain respects in which the Iranian movement conflicted with the
Latin American populist model.
7
 The alternatives are well represented by two of the most common terms of derogation in
Khomeini's Iran - taghuti, or worshipper of idols, a term resuscitated from the Koran, and kravati,
or person who wears a tie from the modern French cravaie. For an interesting discussion of the
promotion and codification of new political terms in the Iranian revolution, see Suroosh Irfani, 'Iran
and the ECO: Towards a New Discourse', Strategic Studies (The Institute of Strategic Studies
Islamabad, Pakistan), 15, no. 2 (Winter 1992), 80-94.
8
 Aziz al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities, p. 31.
9
 See Ayubi, chap. 10, on political and cultural reactions to the modern state.
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(Egypt), and the extension of alternative social services (Lebanon, Algeria).
Even where hitherto religious forms of activity have been used - the mass
prayer meeting, the gathering of Muslims at Mecca for the hajj - this has been
for political purposes. It is, therefore, as aspirants to political power, and as
exercisers of it, that the Islamist movements merit particular attention.
In the light of developments both political and academic, it may now.be
possible to look again at the rise of Islamism and examine in more detail some
of the issues raised in this first reaction. In what follows, four such issues and
the literature pertaining to them will be examined: the international dimensions
of the Islamist movements, or 'Islamic threat'; the record of Islamist movements
in power; the changing character of Islamist movements themselves; the
framework of social science work on Islamic societies.
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
Since the 1970s, the theme of an international 'Islamic Threat' has become
prominent in political discussion in the West. The first re-emergence of this
stereotype was a result of the broader repercussions of the Iranian revolution of
1979 and the subsequent strengthening of Islamist movements elsewhere. The
components of this international 'threat' are known to all: embassies and their
occupants seized, terrorist attacks on planes and civilians, rhetoric about
chopping off the hands of 'imperialism', the growth in Europe of the coercive
veiling of women. To these themes of the early part of the 1980s has now been
added a new one: the claim, voiced by some within the Islamic world, that with
the fall of communism it is 'Islam' which will provide the major challenge to
the West, and a more long-lasting and tenacious one at that.
There are several evident problems with this picture, much as it is espoused
by elements on both sides of the supposed 'Islam-West' divide. The first is that,
even if one concedes that they aspire to challenge the West, it greatly overstates
the strength of the Islamic countries, in military, political or economic terms.
Militarily there has been no serious strategic threat from the Islamic world since
the Turks were turned back at Lepanto (1517) and Vienna (1683). Politically,
Islam is quite different from communism in that it is not able to mobilize support
from significant sections of the population in Western societies: the presence
of around 6 million Muslims in western Europe, a result of migration since the
Second World War, may pose a range of social and economic problems, but is
hardly a threat to the 260 million other people who live in these countries. The
Islamic and Islamist movements active in western Europe, in themselves
fragmented, are concerned more with religious issues within the community, or
with political developments in the Middle East and South Asia, than with
affecting the political character of western Europe: the two most explosive
issues of recent years, the Satanic Verses affair in Britain, and the dispute over
foulards, or headscarves, in France, were not directed at non-Muslim society but
were perceived by Muslims as responses to hostility towards Muslim
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communities from the non-Muslim world.10 Moreover, while the Islamists are
not short of their own rhetoric of denunciation and demagogy, much of the
language and practice of confrontation comes not from the Islamists at all but
from those opposed to them, or who find in them a convenient scapegoat - be
it Orthodox Christians in Serbia and Greece, or right-wing parties in France,
Germany, Holland or Denmark. The 'threat' is often a projection of the
aggression of non-Muslims. This theme is well explored in the work of German
scholars, where the concept of 'hostile image' (German Feindbild) is used to
examine the composite image of the threatening Islamic world in Western
society, combining revived historic themes (Muslim 'expansion', enmity to
Christianity, etc.) with contemporary issues (oil, hostages, terrorism, adminis-
trative and commercial corruption)."
Perhaps the most important corrective to the image of a menacing Islamic
world involves getting away from the certainties of both Islamic and
non-Islamic images and breaking up, or disaggregating, the picture of a single
Muslim society and polity - in other words, providing an alternative, contingent
and varied analysis of what is involved in these Islamist movements. Several
of the authors in the Hippler-Lueg volume do this: Reinhard Schulze and Azmi
Bishara trace the evolution of Islamist thinking, both contingently, in relation
to the political and social changes in Muslim countries over the past century,
and critically, by showing how confected and 'modern' much supposedly
traditional thinking is. Thus the central Islamist concept of al-hakimiyya, or
(Islamic) governance, was an Ottoman invention of, at the earliest, the
eighteenth century and was introduced into Islamist thinking by the twentieth-
century thinkers al-Maududi and Seyyid Qutb;12 the invocation of shari'a law
as a traditional legal system to which Muslims should return disguises the fact
that in the Koran itself there is hardly any jurisprudence, at most eighty out of
the book's 6,000 verses being concerned with legal questions.13
In a parallel disaggregation, John Esposito, an American expert on the politics
of the Islamic world, has set out to counter this myth, and to disentangle its
various components.14 He examines how, within a range of Islamic countries,
10
 Jorgen Nielsen, Muslims in Western Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992).
This judicious book is part of the excellent series, Islamic Surveys, put out by Edinburgh which also
includes Heinz Halm's Shiism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991). For an earlier study
of Muslims in France, see Giles Keppel, Les Banlieuesde I'lslam (Paris: Seuil, 1987). For one British
case see my Arabs in Exile: Yemeni Migrants in Urban Britain (London: I. B. Tauris, 1992).
" Jochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg, eds, Feinbild Islam (Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag,
1993). An English translation is being prepared for publication with Pluto Press in 1995.
12
 Bishara in Hippler and Lueg, Feinbild, pp. 104-10. Ayubi (Political Islam, p. 3) suggests
al-hakimiyya originates with the early Islamic breakaway Kharijite sect.
13
 Bishara in Hippler and Lueg, Feinbild, p. 114. As Bishara points out, this is in marked contrast
to the Judaic Halakha, which does contain a very detailed set of legal prescriptions. On shari 'a, see
also Olivier Roy, L 'echec de I 'Islam politique (Paris: Seuil, 1992), p. 240; and al-Azmeh, Islams and
Modernities, pp. 10-14, 24-5, 93-4. An English translation of Roy's book has been published by
I. B. Tauris as The Failure of Political Islam.
14
 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat, Myth or Reality? (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992).
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political movements and social movements of religious revival have emerged
in the modern age, in response to foreign domination and influence. Thinkers
and politicians have tried to produce a model of an alternative society to that
of the West, drawing on the resources of Islamic history, theology and idiom.
If there is nothing uniquely Islamic about this - such have been the responses
throughout the world dominated by the major Western powers - this phenom-
enon of revival and assertion is also extremely varied within the Muslim
countries. There is no more one 'Islam' or Islamic movement, than there is one
'Christianity', a point well illustrated from the field of international relations.
If it is not conventional to talk of the US nuclear arsenal as the 'Judaeo-Christian
bomb', then there is little reason to talk of the weapons of, say, Pakistan, Iran
or Libya as the 'Islamic bomb'. In the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 much was said
about Saddam as incarnating the Islamic threat: yet he himself is an eminently
secular leader, who has suppressed the independent clergy inside Iraq, and
draws his ideological inspiration from European fascism and a little Leninism.
His dispute with Kuwait was not about Allah, but about more secular matters:
oil, debt, frontiers, prestige. This is a point that is also well illustrated in the study
by James Piscatori of responses in the Islamic world to the Gulf War itself:15
these varied from support, often for quite secular reasons, to abstention or
opposition by religious groups, whose mentors in either Iran or Saudi Arabia
gave clear guidance that Saddam was not to be supported. One interesting, if
not particularly significant, example of this was the self-appointed promoter of
the 'Muslim Parliament' in Britain, Kalim Saddiqi: quick to voice opinions on
other matters, he was curiously silent during the Gulf War. The secular might
suspect some connection between this and his ideological patrons in Tehran.
A number of recent books on international relations exemplify this approach,
at once comparative and contingent. Avi Shlaim's War and Peace in the Middle
East is a critical historical survey of Western policy in this region during the
twentieth century, showing how it has shaped local states and inter-state conflict:
the 'Islamic' factor has little place in the story.16 Bassam Tibi's study of the
international situation from the June War of 1967 to the war over Kuwait makes
much of regional political culture, but sees this as much in authoritarian and
patriarchal terms as in anything specific to its religion.1? Farhang Rajaee's edited
study of the Iran-Iraq war, the major consequence of the Islamic revolution in
Iran and one often presented in timeless ahistorical terms (Sunnis versus
Shi-ites, Arabs - even Babylonians - versus Persians) brings out the modern,
secular interests that led to and sustained this, the second longest inter-state
15
 James Piscatori, ed., Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1991). See also my 'The Fractured Umma: Islamist Movements, Social Upheaval and the Gulf
War', Oxford International Review, 2, no. 3 (summer 1991), 28-32.
16
 Avi Shlaim, War and Peace in the Middle East: A Critique of American Policy (New York:
Viking, 1994).
17
 Bassam Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1967-91 (London: Macmillan, 1993).
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conflict of the twentieth century.18 As for its successor conflict, the war over
Kuwait in 1990-91, this had very little religious content or impact, as already
noted in regard to the study by Piscatori. One can search through the copious
literature on this conflict to find any substantive 'Islamic' element, beyond
demagogy on both Arab sides, in the causes, course or outcome of the war. The
Iraqi state, and its policy throughout the conflict, can be much better explained
in terms of secular and comparative concepts than in any 'Islamic' terms.19
THE ISLAMISTS IN POWER
For anyone wanting an introduction to the broader international dimensions,
Esposito's is an excellent account. He takes one into the mental world of the
Islamist thinkers, and highlights some of the nonsense produced by politicians
in the West, for reasons of strategic alarmism, or anti-migrant opportunism, in
recent years. His book contains a rich critique of the monolithic view of Islam,
and an effective challenge to stereotypes. Esposito is also good on the earlier
history of prejudice against Muslims — in the speeches of Martin Luther and the
early fathers of Croatian nationalism, amongst others.
If critique of the stereotype of an 'Islamic threat' clarifies international issues,
it is, however, less satisfactory in providing the basis on which to evaluate these
movements themselves, not as a threat to the West, but as a threat to Muslims,
or, more generally, as an analysis of what kind of social and political system
the Islamists aspire to construct and, when they come to power, do construct.
As the summaries of their thought make clear, the leading ideologues of
Islamism are a miserable bunch - ill-informed, prejudiced, rambling, patriar-
chal demagogues. The diatribes of Seyyid Qutb, the Egyptian Islamist, against
the West as the land of 'ignorance,' or jahiliyya, are tawdry nonsense. In the
cases where they have come to power - the Iran of Khomeini, the Sudan of
Turabi - the Islamists have established reigns of terror against secular and
democratic forces, against women and against ethnic minorities who resist the
chauvinism of the dominant Islamist groups.
In this perspective, the events of the past ten to fifteen years enable us to shift
beyond the study of how Islamist movements arise to the study of what they do
when they are in power. The most evident example of this is Iran, but the Sudan
provides a second example, as do the experiences of local administration by
Islamic groups in parts of Lebanon, Algeria and indeed Egypt. Two broad
developments are interesting here. One is the degree to which, in practice,
Islamist movements have been able to move into the area of welfare and local
administration, offering a model of egalitarian and relatively honest
administration that contrasts with that of the secular central state, absent and
18
 Farhang Rajaee, The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression (Gainesville: University Press
of Florida, 1993).
19
 Amongst the multitude of books on the crisis, the following are amongst the most informative
and judicious: Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and
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simultaneously corrupt: the example of the Cairo earthquake of 1992 in which
it was the unofficial Islamist groups, not the central state, which provided shelter
and medical assistance to the victims is one telling case. In Lebanon and
elsewhere, not least Palestine, the success of the Islamists has been in offering
basic social services: medical assistance, education, low-priced or free basic
goods and, very importantly, an alternative legal system. Even in the case of
Palestine, where the PLO/al-Fath had not been in power, it was, by dint of being
a government-in-waiting and one that was influenced by prevailing patterns
elsewhere in the Middle East, affected by having some of the reputation for
corruption and inefficiency of established states; its competitor, Hamas,
benefited accordingly. The movements are often flexible, and, as has been
shown in states like Jordan, capable of making tactical adjustments to the state.
Once in possession of state power, however, the Islamists have shown that
they were in many respects less adaptable: within three years of returning to Iran,
Khomeini had crushed his opponents and imposed a dictatorial reign. As in his
earlier ideology so in his constitution and system of government there was a
contingent combination, this time in the service of a revolutionary state: Islamic
concepts, based on the sovereignty of Allah, were enunciated parallel to a
modern political structure, based on elections and parliamentary government,
of Western derivation. The degree of accommodation to contemporary reality
is revealed in one very interesting theoretical development towards the end of
his life, where Khomeini evolved a theory of what may be called 'Islamic raison
d'etat'\ a theory of how, if the interest of the state so required, all other
prescriptions, based on religion, could be overruled.20 If, as will be examined
later, the Iranian revolution did produce a distinctive state, in many other
respects — subjugation of ethnic minorities, mobilization of patriotism to fight
a foreign invader, espousal of internationalism based on the interests of the
revolutionary state - Iran pursued policies very similar to other revolutions.21
(h'tuiie continued)
War in the New World Order (London: Faber and Faber, 1993); Ken Matthews, The Gulf Conflict
and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1993); John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, The
Origins of the Kuwait Conflict and the International Response (London: Faber and Faber, 1991).
There is also nothing specifically 'Islamic' in the accounts of the conflict by Muslim writers, for
example, Ghazi Alghosaibi, The Gulf Crisis: An Attempt to Understand (London: Kegan Paul
International, 1993). My own reflections are 'The Gulf War of 1991 - Implications for International
Relations', Review of International Studies, 20 (1994), 109-30.
20
 I have discussed this at greater length in 'The Politics of Islamic Fundamentalism: Iran, Tunisia
and the Challenge to the Secular State' in Akbar Ahmad and Hastings Donnan, eds, Islam in theA^e
of Post-Modernity (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 91-113. See also Johannes Reissner, 'Der Imam
und die Verfassung', Orient, 29 (1988), 213-36.
21
 On the combination of nationalism and internationalism, see Fred Halliday, 'Iranian Foreign
Policy Since 1979: Internationalism and Nationalism in the Islamic Revolution', in Nikki Keddie
and Ian Cole, eds, Shi'ism and Social Protest (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987),
pp. 88-107.
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The early history of the post-revolutionary regime, and the eminently secular
mechanisms of its consolidation have been well documented in Shaul Bakhash's
The Reign of the Ayatollahs, the best narrative account of the revolution and its
aftermath.22 The subsequent history is well discussed in the study of another
Iranian writer, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, After Khomeini.23 The regime was able
to survive the twin challenges of the late 1980s - accepting a compromise peace
with Iran that nullified the sacrifices of the past eight years, and effecting a
smooth transition to the post-Khomeini system. The Islamic Republic has
developed a system of managed pluralism, evident in the variety of political
forces present in the press and parliament, but all within a framework controlled
by the revolutionary regime itself. In particular, a new revolutionary elite, based
on but not exclusively composed of the clergy, has consolidated its position.
Addressing the question of how distinctive the Iranian model is and how religion
functions within this post-revolutionary regime, Ehteshami sees religion as
providing a distinctive ideological legitimation for the regime's political
controls and for the sacrifices it has demanded of the people: in this perspective,
it is distinct from, but functionally parallel to, other contemporary revolutionary
ideologies. Examining three aspects of the Islamic Republic - foreign relations,
economic policy, political system - Ehteshami shows how similar post-
revolutionary Iran has been to other modern regimes. For all that the mullahs
claim to have introduced a different model their Republic is more conventional
and, hence, intelligible than a study of rhetoric alone would suggest.
Similar conclusions are reached in studies of other societies in which 'Islam'
is said to provide a guiding, and distinctive, model. In Pakistan, 'Islam' has been
used as an instrument for the consolidation of a military regime, and, more
broadly, of a nationalistic sentiment vis-a-vis India. The military regime of the
1980s used the Islamist grouping, the Jama'at-i Islami, to counter its secular and
nationalist opponents, but this was in the service of eminently secular and
universal goals, not part of a distinctive social or political project. In Saudi
Arabia, 'Islam', in its Wahhabite form, has been the dominant ideology ever
since the state was constituted in the 1920s: but here too what may seem to be
a unique society turns out to be a tribal oligarchy, enhanced in recent decades
with massive oil revenues, and pursuing conventional political goals, at home
and abroad. What is distinctive about Saudi Arabia has been not so much its
ideological, let alone, moral character as the combination of a recently
established nomadic regime with the enormous, unearned wealth that oil has
22
 Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs (London: I. B. Tauris, 1985).
23
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provided.24 Saudi Arabia is not a democracy, and it is therefore difficult to assess
the causes or impact of political changes that can be observed from outside: but
it would seem, at the least, plausible that the changes in regime policy - for
example, on political representation, on oil output, on foreign policy
questions - respond to very real pressures on it. It is trying, with calculation, to
respond to these in order to protect its own hold on power and wealth, if also
to protect the Holy Places of Islam. A study of Saudi policy with regard to the
international media — press, satellite, news agencies — might reveal at least as
much of the material and the political as of the spiritual in these ventures.
Representatives of Islamist states and movements make much of the apparent
Western hostility to their religion and aspirations, yet many of the most critical
studies come from within their own societies. Thus, in his introduction to The
Pakistan Experience Asghar Khan writes of how the Muslim world is dominated
by the struggle against obscurantism: 'This battle against ignorance and
exploitation, which most of the Muslim World has yet to win, is made more
complicated by the exploitation of religion by vested interests; monarchs,
mullahs, dictators, usurpers and opportunists' P A critical account of the course
of the Iranian regime is given in Fariba Adelkhah and others in Thermidor en
Iran}6 In addition to the widespread human rights violations, the authors point
out how the regime has introduced its own, peculiar and new dogmatic
interpretation of religion and has created, or better re-created, a state with many
of the features of the previous, royal and secular, regime. Thus it relies on a
managed system of distribution of oil revenues and on corruption to maintain
political control even as it pursues Persian nationalism within (vis-a-vis the 50
per cent of the population who are not Persians) and without. As they themselves
put it, this regime is distinctive in comparison with other modern revolutionary
regimes in that it is 'authoritarian, but not totalitarian', meaning that there is a
greater degree of diversity — of opinions, political trends, economic activities —
than in other modern revolutionary states. However, what is perhaps the greatest
failing of this regime, again in contrast to other revolutionary states, is the lack
of any economic programme: the concept of iqtisad-i tauhidi — so-called Islamic
or 'unitary' economics - proclaimed at the time of the revolution has turned out
to be a combination of statist incompetence and populist platitudes. The
obsessive and cruel concern with matters of dress and social conduct contrasts
with the lack of ideas, and indeed interest, with regard to economics.
In another, more cultural and long-tern\, perspective, these failures are
24
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examined in an engaging polemic by the Iranian writer Darius Shayegan.27
Shayegan speaks with the voice of the Iranian intelligentsia that Khomeini with
his cultural revolution sought above all to silence. He evokes, on the one hand,
the rich and irreverent literary and political culture of Iran, pre-Islamic and
Islamic, to pour scorn on Khomeini's pretensions; he identifies the problem, on
the other hand, as a result of a cultural and intellectual failure, but also puts the
Islamic revolution in a much broader context of comparative intellectual
thought, comparing it unfavourably to what has happened in India and the Far
East, and deploying a range of Western writers, from Thomas Kuhn to Michel
Foucault, to highlight the cultural and intellectual blockages present in Islamic
culture. He sees the rise of fundamentalism as 'a funeral procession of petrified
dreams wandering off to lose itself in the sands of the desert'. Shayegan's verdict
is telling:
The real danger of Islamization lies not in its excesses, its random changes of
direction, its blind groping, its utter obsolescence, but in the fact that, being
incapable of setting up a structured historical order, it produces chaos; and this
favours the more subversive and sinister elements who loiter in the corridors of
powers waiting for their time to come. Absolutely anything can emerge from this
Pandora's box: the most improbable and appalling monsters in the political
menagerie, from Gaddafi to Pol Pot via the whole spectrum of crazed visionaries.
For the cult of revolution becomes an end in itself, sets up its own demonology.
Islam is blundering through adventures which are wholly foreign to its meaning and
purpose. It has already injured itself badly, for in trying to rise above history it has
become one of history's by-products, just another ideological blind alley.28
THE 'NEW' ISLAMISM
This raises the question of how, even within the past few years, the social
character of these movements may have changed.
This internal development is the subject of Olivier Roy's important study of
the 'crisis' of political Islam.29 Roy, author of an earlier and more sympathetic
work on the opposition movements in Afghanistan, sets out here a critique of
the 'neofundamentalists' who have come to dominate the movements in Iran,
Afghanistan and North Africa. He argues that the crisis of political Islam reflects
several trends: that in contrast to the earlier generation of leaders, who were
versed in Islamic learning and law, the new leadership are political opportunists,
using bits of tradition for their own purposes; that they lack any coherent view
of how to reorganize society in the late twentieth century, not least in the field
of economics; and that, increasingly, Islamist movements are being taken over
27
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by groups of armed young men who impose their will, and interpretations, on
other Muslims. Islamism was a movement, a fragile synthesis of Islam and
modernity, which in the end failed to take root.
Roy terms the new militants a iumpenintelligentsia', half-educated and
resentful youth, whose work is now evident in Algeria, in the assassination of
secular intellectuals, and the street violence against women. The tactics
employed by the Islamists in Algeria, and increasingly in Egypt, are in sharp
contrast to those employed during the Iranian revolution where, despite the
mobilization of millions of people, attacks on individuals were almost unknown.
An example of this cruelty is the practice of the Algerian Islamists in attacking
women who take buses, on the grounds that they should not take public transport
until it is segregated. Roy is excellent in showing how far Khomeini's ideology,
far from being distinct from other Third World ideologies, is a variant of the
populism and radicalism of the 1950s and 1960s and has no more hope than those
beliefs of resolving the problems of the societies in which they emerge. One can,
however, wonder how far Roy's 'failure' is something subsequent to an earlier
more admirable phase, and how much it has merely brought out factors within
Islamism that were always there: at times he reads like some former supporter
of the Bolshevik revolution lamenting a 'degeneration' that may have been
inscribed in the earlier history.
Yet he himself at times recognizes that the roots of the problem lie in the
rejection by classical Islam of critical or independent thought. Part of Roy's
indictment is directed against Iran and the manipulation of the Islamist
movements in other countries by the Islamic Republic: but it is hardly original
for a revolution to manage its links with other revolutionaries in this way. At
the same time, and despite such manipulations, revolutions continue to enjoy
sympathy abroad and, even when not directly involved, to inspire others by their
force of example. This was true of Russia and, later, China; and despite Roy's
doubts on the extent of Iranian influence, is also true of Iran: the rise of Hamas
amongst the Palestinians and of the FIS and al-Nahda in North Africa has
nothing to do with there being Shi'ites in these countries, and little to do with
Iranian material influence. In addition to links through Lebanon, it has much to
do with the respect which an intransigent and militant rejection of the West
inspires in these peoples, and with the growth, especially during the 1980s, of
hostility to the corrupt, 'modernizing', post-colonial state.30
If Roy's overall thesis is valid, namely that a new, tougher and less traditional
leadership has emerged, then it marks a significant revision of the terms in which
much earlier study of Islamist movements was phrased. In the classic
formulation of Ernest Gellner's Muslim Society, Islam had two traditions - a
30
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'high' literate or scholarly one, and a 'low' popular or folk one.31 Islamism, or
as he characteristically termed it, 'Che Khomeinism', represented a movement
by the high leadership, such as Khomeini, mobilizing and controlling the
believers, and at the expense of popular Islam: it could, therefore, favour a
modernizing state. According to Gellner, Weberian expectations about the need
for secularization have, therefore, been proved wrong.
Challenging as it is, however, it is difficult to accept Gellner's argument in
either its original or later forms. The initial problem with Gellner's account is
that it is based on an extrapolation to the Middle East as a whole of a specific,
North African history. It also overstates the compatibility of the scholarly
tradition with modernity: the interest of the defenders of the 'high' tradition in
opposing modernity, and in particular rational, individualist and open thinking,
is obscured. Moreover the more recent evolution of mass fundamentalism, itself
a reflection of the failures of the 'high', has led to a three-way split, between
the 'high', 'low' and now 'lumpen' variants of Islamism, the latter involving
the rejection of both the popular sentiments of the 'low' and the learning and
traditional sense of political calculation and juridical authority of the 'high'. One
can, indeed, rescue Weber by reference to the Islamic experience: secularization
has, despite appearances, gone further than Gellner implies: yet, when it has not,
there has been stagnation, a point Gellner recognizes albeit inadequately in
regard to the economy.32
ANALYSIS OF MIDDLE EASTERN SOCIETY
In contrast to the literature surveyed so far, which approaches Islamic societies
and their politics in terms of religion and Islamist movements, there is another
body of work that seeks, first, to provide a general understanding of how these
societies work, and then proceeds to locate the particular, contingent role of
religious belief and organization within it. In essence, the answer to the question
of 'Islam' which these studies provide is first to analyse the society in question
and then to discuss particular Islamic phenomena. In a more contemporary vein,
a number of important general studies of Arab society have recently been
produced which exemplify this overall approach. Hisham Sharabi's Neopatri-
archy is one of the most perceptive, and critical, books to be published on Arab
society for a long time:33 combining insights from Marx and Freud he develops
a concept of 'neopatriarchy' as an alternative to modernity, a form of behaviour
with social, political and psychological dimensions common to Arab society and
both embodying and confirming its paralysis. While critical of the false solutions
31
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of the revolutionary and nationalist movements, he is equally critical of the
fundamentalists whose authoritarian and masculinist ideology he sees as another
variant of neopatriarchy. Sharabi shares with Bassam Tibi and Darius Shayegan
an emphasis on the inhibiting role of culture, and a view of how external
domination, in various forms, has contributed to the creation of this malaise in
Middle Eastern society: but he is also critical of Arab political and intellectual
leaders, and astringent about the prospects for an improvement. In both analysis
and tone he breaks with the polarities of the imperialist/anti-imperialist debate
that has dominated, and warped, so much discussion of this region and produces
a model of independent analysis.34 In a work of comparable range, and reflective
depth, another Palestinian academic based in the United States, Halim Barakat,
has produced a powerful account of the modern Arab world, combing social,
cultural, psychological and political analysis.35 Like Sharabi, Barakat has
shared, in earlier times, hopes for the secular and later religious radical
movements: but his conclusion is now clear, that religion cannot provide the
basis for a transformation of Arab society. Reforming intellectuals abstract the
concepts of Islam from the context in which they originated and had meaning,
they seek to create a new form of power; in the end, they have neither a vision
nor a programme for the future.36
The approach and range of these two works by Palestinian intellectuals is
matched in that of two Western writers who have provided studies of the
contemporary politics and society of the Arab world. Roger Owen has attempted
a general, accessible overview of the region's politics and in this he is more than
successful, providing comprehensive analysis of the Arab states and the three
non-Arab ones - Iran, Turkey, Israel.37 In common with others, he provides an
explanation of the Islamist upsurge that is sensitive to its political and
ideological peculiarities, but which sets it in a comparative, and social, context.
His discussion of the Islamic Republic of Iran is particularly interesting,
focusing on such issues as the role of the leader and its pluralism, in contrast
to any specifically theological form. But Owen's book, building on the
pioneering example of his earlier studies in economic history,38 also constitutes
a theoretical critique of other, more 'orientalist' approaches: he advocates:
34
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beginning from a perspective that sees the Middle East first and foremost as part
of the Third, or non-European, World, and subject to most of the same universal
historical processes, from colonial rule, through the era of planning and
development to the present era of a much more eclectic pattern of political and
economic management.39
Comparison is, in work of this kind, the most effective break with regional or
theological determinism: matching the discussion of economic processes in his
earlier work, Owen here focuses on the formation of the state in the Middle East
and the manner in which a succession of influences - colonialism, nationalism,
revolution, oil, inter-state confrontation - have shaped these political systems.
Within all this, religious tradition, and religiously inspired thinkers and
movements, play a role, but not a determinant or monist one.
The most ambitious and persuasive of these reassessments is Simon
Bromley's Rethinking Middle East Politics.40 Its strengths are several: a general
history of the region from the time of the Muslim conquests, a set of distinct
Studies of state formation and social development in the major countries of the
region (Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran), an overview of the impact of
imperialism and of subsequent international factors on the region, a set of
measured, sober assessments of future developments. This analysis, based on
a wide reading of the best secondary sources, is combined with a careful,
decisive but not intrusive application of concepts in social theory, which both
organize the empirical material and give the book its added interest.
Bromley' s discussion of Weber and Gellner, and his decipherment of the role
of 'Islam' in shaping the modern Middle East, are commanding, while his
analysis of the role of external factors, far from conceptions of an omnipotent
and diabolical imperialism, again cuts through many an argument. But in contrast
to so many who rest on the laurels of their critique, he produces his positive
construction, an alternative explanation of state formation, of the differences
between these societies, and of the interaction of the local states with external
forces. Perhaps the greatest strength of Bromley's work is that it provides by far
the most persuasive account yet of the difficulties of creating democracy in the
Middle East.41 He identifies two competing interpretations: one, an essentialist
approach, argues for the incompatibility of 'Islam' with democracy; the other,
a critical approach, blames the lack of democracy on Western influence and
intervention and, by extension, on the authoritarian regimes prompted by the
conflict with Israel. Bromley's analysis shows why both of these are inadequate,
lacking either historical depth or sociological precision.
Drawing on a critique of Max Weber and a reassessment of Karl Marx,
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Bromley argues that it is impossible to understand the Middle East in terms of
models that distinguish it from the West: such understanding is not to be
achieved by asking why the Middle East or other parts of the Third World
'failed' to develop as the West did, because it is the 'West' itself, and in
particular the separation of the economy from the state, that requires
explanation.42 What is needed, Bromley argues, is an analysis that leaves open
the relation of the state to economics, and hence to civil society as a whole, and
which draws up a series of empirically based, historical and comparative studies
of societies as they came into contact with 'modernity': the latter, predominantly
in the form of Western imperialism, had a major impact on the region, at once
devastating and formative, but cannot be presented with a unique effectiveness,
separate from the political and social forces operating within the societies of the
region. Bromley gives several reasons for the weakness of democracy in the
region inherent in the political system of its constituent states and rejects
conventional explanations in terms of ideology: 'the relative absence of
democracy in the Middle East has little to do with the region's Islamic culture
and much to do with its particular pattern of state formation'.43
There are questions which this study leaves open, not least the precise ways
in which ideology, in religious or secular form, serves to legitimate, or
challenge, established states: it is one thing to say that it is shaped and used by
social forces - 'more an effect than a cause' in Bromley's words - another to
say that it has no autonomous impact at all. But, as this book shows so clearly,
any resolution of this question will involve a clarification of the role of political
culture in theoretical and comparative terms, before any particular answers with
regard to the Middle East can be produced. It would be difficult to overstate the
theoretical range, and analytic insight, of Simon Bromley's book, one of the
most original to be published on the Middle East, or indeed any part of the Third
World, in recent years, and at the same time a stimulating contribution to social
theory.
THE CHALLENGES OF METHOD
As the discussion of these works indicates, the analysis of the Islamist
movements and of the societies in which they flourish raises not just questions
of political analysis, but also of method. To the long-established debates on
method - 'historical' or 'scientific' - this region has added its own, that
between the 'orientalists' and their critics. These have now been joined by a
third, that associated with the critique of enlightenment rationality and with
postmodernism. It may come as no surprise to discover that there are many
42
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working in, and on, the region who have reacted enthusiastically to this new
theoretical option: it appears to be a way of escaping from the constrictions of
a knowledge associated with imperial domination, it offers a means of
conveying the subjectivity and passion of Islamist movements themselves, and
it offers, to the Islamists and their sympathizers, a modular system of ideas from
which they can pick individual concepts without embracing a complete, and
potentially alien, conceptual system. While some authors seem to be responding
favourably to this possibility,44 others, veterans of other illusions and frustrated
emancipations, have a more cautious view. Thus, Sharabi:
My feeling is that while the intellectual world of late capitalism perhaps can
accommodate without much damage the aestheticism and scepticism of a Foucault
or a Derrida, the intellectuals of the post-colonial periphery, including the Arab
world, can ill afford the risks of philosophical and anti-theoretic scepticism; and
even were they to take this risk, it would - probably - only lead them to political
paralysis.45
The question of modernity and Islamism can be posed in at least two ways,
derivative of the two meanings of modernity itself, namely as a system of
rationalist thought, broadly derived from the enlightenment, and as a system of
social organization, produced by the industrial revolution. It is certainly easy
to see how the rise of Islamist movements can be considered as a rejection of
modernity in this first, intellectual and philosophical sense, in that Islamism
explicitly renounces some of the core tenets of that inheritance - secularism,
individualism, tolerance, democracy, gender equality, among them. Many
Islamists would claim this, as would many of their opponents, such as Shayegan,
and as would, for their own purposes, postmodernists outside the Islamic world
keen to identify movements that reinforce their claims on discursive pluralism
and deconstruction. Yet even this argument can be questioned. If the rise of
Islamism is proof of the end of modernity as a philosophical system, then the
least one can say is that there are many other things that have happened in this
century and indeed before which would qualify for such a role - extreme
movements of the secular and racist right, and the mystique of social engineering
on the left among them. Moreover, while the Islamists and their opponents claim
that their ideology is anti-enlightenment and rejects modernity, the analysis of
their ideas discussed above suggests that the verdict is far more mixed, that, in
some sense, Islamism is a mixture, a hybrid, of modernity and anti-modernity.
For all the latter that is present, there is also a recognition, a necessary
incorporation, of ideas that are very much within the political spectrum of the
enlightenment tradition. As with nationalisms, the framework of apparent
44
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rejection, in favour of irrationalism and particularism, contains a set of
propositions that are both universal and derived from modernity. This is not to
subscribe to Gellner's view of an acceptable compatibility between 'high' Islam
and modernity, let alone his denial of secularization: rather it shows how far,
despite religious inhibitions, modernity and secularization have their impact.
If this is so of the relation to modernity as an intellectual system, it is arguably
even more so with regard to modernity as a social system. Theorists of
modernity, be they Marx and Weber, stressed the degree to which this system,
or condition, constrained collective options, whether of nations, state or classes,
even as it generated myths of escape and defiance. The past century or so has
seen plenty of such myths, which have mobilized large numbers of people in
projects that have, in one way or another, been contained and undermined by
the constraints of a more powerful modernity. The same fate would appear, with
all its variants, to be awaiting Islamism. Like other movements of mobilization
and protest, of left or right, Islamism has drawn on very real tensions within the
societies it influences and will, beyond what it has already achieved, be able to
establish states that reflect its ideology. Yet it is in several respects incapable
of escaping from modernity, even as it rails against it: in terms of technology,
economics, the acquisition and retention of power, and, as we have seen,
ideology itself, it has no choice but to use the instruments which are there, even
as it is itself incapable of generating an autonomous, or alternative, policy in
these regards. Suppressed as these may now be by the conformities of protest
and revolution, there are strong currents in these societies which seek not greater
difference, or return to an imagined past, but incorporation into the world of
industrialization, consumerism and greater individual freedom. The tension
between the hybrid challenge to modernity, evident in the official policies of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, and the desire of the population for security, freedom
and greater wealth (good old enlightenment goals) is clear enough. If those
wishes are not allowed to come into the open, it is in part because the Islamic
state has available to it instruments and practices of an eminently secular and
modern kind to suppress them.
Islamism will not easily be contained, either in the societies where it has come
to power or in those where, expressing the very real frustrations of populations,
it is gaining ground. In the end, however, the Islamist movements may be forced
to concede to the world outside or, in defiance of the criteria that their own
populations articulate, to prolong their stay in power at even greater cost, only
to succumb later.
